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Refugee Repatriation and the Problem of Consent 
 
This is a penultimate draft. When possible, please cite the final:  
Mollie Gerver. Forthcoming. ‘Refugee Repatriation and the Problem of 
Consent.’ British Journal of Political Science. 
 
 
Abstract: 
 
Over the past decade, millions of refugees have fled their countries of origin 
and asked for asylum abroad. Some of these refugees do not receive 
asylum, but nor are they deported. Instead they are detained, or denied 
basic rights of residency, some forced into enclosed camps. Hoping to 
escape such conditions, they wish to return to unsafe countries, and ask for 
help from non-governmental organizations (NGOs) and the United Nations 
High Commissioner for Refugees. In such cases, should NGOs and the UN 
assist refugees to return? Drawing on original data gathered in South 
Sudan, and existing data from around the world, I argue that they should 
assist with return if certain conditions are met. First, the UN and NGOs 
must try to put an end to coercive conditions before helping with return. 
Secondly, helping with return must not encourage the government to 
expand the use of coercive policies to encourage more to return. Finally, 
NGOs and the UN must ensure that refugees are fully informed of the risks 
of returning. Organizations must either conduct research in countries of 
origin or lobby the government to allow refugees to visit their countries of 
origin before making a final decision. 
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George was followed home. As he reached for his keys to his apartment in 
Tel Aviv, he was startled by a voice from behind. 
 
‘Pack your belongings’, a policeman ordered. George was told he had a 
week to return to South Sudan or be detained indefinitely in Israel. 
 
George had originally fled South Sudan for Egypt during the Second 
Sudanese Civil War in the 1980s. He failed to find secure protection in 
Egypt1 and so crossed the Sinai Dessert in 2008, entering Israeli territory 
with the help of smugglers. Between 2007 and 2012, roughly 60,000 other 
East African asylum seekers crossed into Israel in a similar manner. Upon 
reaching the country, they could not apply for refugee status. In 2012 all 
South Sudanese nationals, numbering approximately 1,200, were told they 
must return or face detention.2  
 
As the policeman drove away, George called Operation Blessing 
International (OBI), a humanitarian organization with offices in Jerusalem. 
He asked for help returning to South Sudan, and was given a free flight 
home and travel documentation. By 2012, nearly all South Sudanese in 
Israel had repatriated via similar means.  
 
It is against international law to indefinitely detain asylum seekers without 
first establishing if they are refugees.3  What is less obvious is whether 
humanitarian organizations should help individuals return to avoid such 
detention.  
                                                 
1 Interview with George, Juba, 2 January 2014. 
2 Gerver 2014a. 
3 Barnett 2001; Chimni 2004. 
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The UN claims it should.4 Over the last decade, it has helped 7.2 million 
refugees repatriate, many from detention. 5  They help because, even if 
governments detain refugees,6 the UN is using no coercion itself, and is 
helping refugees obtain freedom through repatriation.7 It is analogous, one 
could claim, to civil servants clandestinely helping individuals flee 
persecuting regimes. During the Rwandan genocide and the Holocaust, 
such civil servants were celebrated as helping individuals escape injustices.8 
Of course those who fled were coerced; that is why it was commendable to 
help them.  
 
Yet unlike fleeing danger to safety, refugees who return home may be 
trading one injustice for another. In this case, ‘repatriation facilitators’, as I 
refer to them here, cannot normally justify their actions by appealing to the 
outcomes of return. In this eventuality, NGOs have justified their assistance 
by referring to refugees’ consent.9 But it is unclear if there is consent, given 
the presence of coercion.  
 
Most of today’s debates on immigration focus on the actions of states and 
their agents towards migrants and refugees. 10  There have been fewer 
empirical studies on NGO and UN roles in immigration control, and even 
fewer discussions on the ethics of such agencies. In this article, I consider 
                                                 
4 Barnett and Finnemore 2004, 75. 
5 UNHCR 2012. 
6 Gibney 2013. 
7 Repatriation assistance usually involves paying for transport home when refugees lack the funds to 
do so, and arranging travel documentation. There is also, in some cases, the provision of food aid 
during the first year after return. See UNHCR 1996.  
8 Fujii 2009; Lidegaard 2013. 
9 Some NGOs in Israel explicitly justified their actions on these grounds. See Gerver 2015. 
10 Betts 2010; Carens 1987; Gibney 2004; Miller 2005. 
 4 
what dilemmas repatriation facilitators face, and how they may better 
address them.  
 
In the following section I will elaborate on my methodology, which 
combines empirical political science and normative political philosophy. I 
will use this methodology to address three ethical dilemmas that emerged 
from my empirical research. In Section 2 I will first address the coercion 
dilemma, occurring when facilitators help with coerced returns without 
causally contributing to the coercion. In Section 3 I address causation 
dilemmas, where facilitating return does causally contribute to coercion. 
Finally, there is a dilemma that cuts across both types of dilemmas: in risk 
dilemmas, NGOs and refugees lack sufficient data to calculate the risks of 
return. In such cases refugees cannot come to an informed decision, even if 
coercion can be mitigated. 
 
Before proceeding, it is necessary to precisely state the aims and clarify the 
assumptions of this article to avoid misunderstanding about the highly 
contentious questions addressed.  
 
I shall consider the ethics11 of facilitators’ actions, rather than their legality, 
focusing on whether these are consistent with NGO and UN aims of 
ensuring only safe and voluntary returns.12  
 
                                                 
11 When I speak of ‘ethics’ I refer to the practice of considering how agents ought to act. This 
requires us to consider which course of action would be consistent with general values we hold, but 
also beliefs about analogous cases. See Daniels 2011. 
12 UNHCR 1996. 
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The refugees under consideration are primarily those who the UN claims 
should not be forcibly returned, but instead given asylum or the 
opportunity to apply for refugee status. These are individuals whose lives 
will likely be at risk from persecution if they return. 13  Using the UN 
definition permits discussion of the UN’s facilitation dilemmas according to 
its own standards. In a similar vein, I use the definition of coercion 
provided by the International Organization of Migration (IOM), a major 
global repatriation facilitator. According to the IOM, coercion occurs when 
one is repatriating to avoid detention, but also when one lacks basic 
necessities if they stay, such as food and shelter.14 
 
Though I mostly focus on refugees fleeing persecution, I will at times 
discuss individuals fleeing food insecurity, lack of medical care and general 
violence. 15  I assume that coercing such ‘survival migrants’ 16  to leave is 
unethical if the state has the capacity to accept such individuals, and if 
accepting these migrants is the only way to ensure that they obtain basic 
human rights. This claim is supported not only by philosophers who 
believe in open borders, such as Joseph Carens,17 but also by those who 
defend states’ right to exclude immigrants, such as David Miller, Matthew 
Gibney and even some states themselves.18 As such, it serves as a ‘minimal 
                                                 
13 See the 1951 Convention and 1967 Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees, available at 
http://www.unhcr.org/3b66c2aa10.html, accessed 23 March 2016.  
14 See IOM 2004, 34. I assume that this is coercion if the state has a duty to provide basic services to 
refugees within its territory. If the government threatens to deny these services to refugees who stay 
in the country, the government is unjustly coercing them into repatriating. This definition of 
coercion is consistent with a range of philosophical approaches. See Anderson 2011. 
15 For example, of the millions currently fleeing Iraq and Syria, many are fleeing war rather than 
persecution based on their identity. See AA (Article 15(c)) Iraq CG [2015] UKUT 00544 (IAC), 
Upper Tribunal (Immigration and Asylum Chamber). 
16 Betts 2010. 
17 Carens 1987. 
18 Betts 2010; Gibney 2004; Miller 2005. 
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ethical standard’19 determining when the state should not deport, while still 
leaving open the question of who repatriation facilitators should help 
return. For simplicity, I will refer to individuals as ‘refugees’ even if their 
return is unsafe for reasons related to general violence or food insecurity, 
rather than persecution. 
 
Though I make the above assumptions throughout the article, one may 
accept my general conclusions while still disagreeing on who deserves 
asylum. My goal is not to settle the debate about who states should protect, 
but to resolve the puzzle of who should be helped to return by the 
aforementioned organizations if governments are coercing individuals to 
leave. 
 
1. METHODOLOGY 
The data I present in this article serves a similar purpose as court 
judgements in jurisprudence, medical cases in bioethics and thought 
experiments in moral philosophy. The data serve as the dilemmas we start 
with, which have yet to be addressed in contemporary debates in political 
theory or public policy.  
 
Political theorists raising ethical dilemmas typically rely on cases found in 
the existing empirical literature.20 I will also refer to the existing literature, 
citing cases of return from a diverse range of countries. However, there are 
very few in-depth studies of repatriation; the few that exist tend to describe 
the aggregate experience of repatriating populations, and often only before 
                                                 
19 Hidalgo 2015. 
20 For example, Bradley 2013; Gibney 2004. 
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return.21 With some exceptions,22  studies rarely explore how individuals 
may have been subject to different injustices both before and after 
repatriation. I aim to capture this range of dilemmas for NGOs and the UN 
with my own in-depth empirical research on repatriation from Israel to 
South Sudan. 
 
A diverse range of examples is useful for normative theorizing. For 
example, in fictional trolley examples used in moral philosophy, a person 
must always decide if it is just to kill one person to save five, but the details 
of each example vary, with one case involving pushing a man to his death 
and another involving pulling a switch. 23  The variation between cases 
highlights whether our intuitions change in response to new variables, 
helping us determine if these variables are normatively significant. I will 
employ a similar approach when formulating a general ethical guideline for 
repatriation.  
 
I choose to focus on the case of NGOs in Israel because there is evidence 
that they had managed to facilitate return that was voluntary and safe in 
the midst of widespread government detention. I seek to determine if they 
succeeded in this endeavour even though the United Nations High 
Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) struggled to do so. 24  Unlike 
repatriation facilitated by UNHCR, OBI in Israel was helping a relatively 
small number repatriate, and so had significant resources to interview each 
refugee individually, to ensure they were not coerced into returning. 
                                                 
21 Blitz, Sales, and Marzano 2005; Harold-Bond 1989; Webber 2011. 
22 Carr 2014; Stefanovic, Loizides, and Parsons 2015; UNHCR 2010. 
23 Thomson 1984. 
24 On multiple occasions, UNHCR has assisted with coerced returns. See Barnett 2001; Chimni 
2004. 
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Importantly, they took no government funds, relying on private donors, to 
avoid acting as an arm of the government’s immigration goals. 
 
To determine if return was voluntary and safe, I interviewed refugees after 
return to learn about their reasons for repatriating and their conditions after 
return. I first travelled to Juba, Aweil and Wau in South Sudan in March 
and April 2012, interviewing twenty-seven individuals. In the summer 
directly following this trip, the Israeli Government announced that all were 
required to repatriate.25 Almost all 1,200 South Sudanese nationals in Israel 
returned at this time, mostly via NGOs. I therefore travelled to East Africa 
again to interview these new returnees. Because many migrated to 
Uganda26 shortly after returning to South Sudan, I conducted fieldwork in 
Kampala and Entebbe in 2013, interviewing twenty-nine returnees.  
 
In December 2013 I reached South Sudan a second time, arriving two days 
before the South Sudanese Civil War broke out. I stayed for six weeks, 
interviewing sixty-one individuals in Juba who returned from Israel, 
roughly half of whom were Nuer and forced by Dinka militias to flee their 
homes to the UN’s internally displaced persons (IDP) camp. I also 
interviewed nine returnees who had fled to Ethiopia in June 2014, visiting 
them in Gambella, situated along the border with South Sudan.  
 
When I arrived in each country, I called two to five contacts provided to me 
by repatriation facilitators and friends in Israel. I then used a snowball 
methodology to interview their acquaintances, their acquaintances’ 
                                                 
25 For the text of the letter sent to South Sudanese, see PIBA (2011). 
26 Gerver 2014b. 
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acquaintances and so forth, until all links were exhausted. After 
transcribing each qualitative interview, I coded responses for subjects’ 
reasons for return, including detention or threats to deportation in Israel, 
and their conditions after return, including food access, income, medical 
care, education, shelter, displacement, and deaths from medical 
complications, cross-fire and ethnic-based violence. 
 
My approach contrasts with survey-based studies that ask closed-ended 
questions, which ask respondents to rate, on a scale, their access to food, 
their level of security and so forth.27 While such surveys are invaluable for 
recording important variables, they have the drawback of limiting the full 
range of refugees’ responses, which I tried to capture fully through in-depth 
qualitative interviews.  
 
The interviews I conducted were not with a randomly selected sample. This 
was partly because I could not obtain a full list of phone numbers of those 
who returned, or access those in especially insecure areas. Nonetheless, I 
strived to obtain a sample that was as diverse as possible, and sought to 
counteract survivor bias whenever possible, travelling extensively within 
each town and surrounding rural areas, interviewing returnees without cell 
phones, secure housing or access to close tarmac roads. During the war, I 
also conducted interviews in both UN IDP camps in Juba, including one in 
the Jebel neighbourhood, where ethnic cleansing was especially 
widespread. Overall, there was most certainly still bias towards those who 
were better off and alive, but this was mitigated to the best extent possible, 
given the constraints.  
                                                 
27 Stefanovic, Loizides, and Parsons 2015; UNHCR 2010. 
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One might suppose that we cannot rely on the responses of those who 
returned. They may misrepresent how much they were coerced to return, 
and how difficult their conditions are today, especially if they were not 
satisfied with their choice to repatriate. My method of sampling was 
designed to mitigate this possibility. Because I interviewed individuals 
living in a diverse range of countries and regions, a significant portion was 
very satisfied with their return, but still recalled being coerced into 
returning, and later fleeing their homes after their return. If even these 
individuals recall similar challenges to those who regretted repatriating, 
this provides stronger evidence of the accuracy of such testimonials. I also 
witnessed conditions described by respondents, such as overcrowding, 
unhygienic latrines, food scarcities and soldiers firing into IDP camps. As 
such, I could corroborate the responses of many interviewees regarding 
these conditions.  
 
This original data from Israel and East Africa are central to this article. 
However, I situate it within the broader range of repatriation cases. The 
case of Israel is not unique because of the dilemma NGOs faced. What was 
unique was the NGOs’ greater financial investment to avoid these 
dilemmas. If such extraordinary measures fail to succeed, this highlights the 
depth of the problem and the need for an ethical analysis. 
 
2. COERCION 
Coercion dilemmas occur when NGOs and UN agencies are faced with the 
choice of either helping with return or watching refugees face confinement 
in camps, detention or an inability to access basic necessities. I will first 
describe this dilemma, and then consider how we might resolve it.  
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2.1 The Dilemma 
In 1991 two million Kurdish refugees fled Iraq, most hoping to reach 
Turkey. They reached a mountainous area separating the two countries, but 
Turkish officials refused to grant them entrance. While current theorists 
focus on the Turkish policy,28 there was also an ethical dilemma for NGOs: 
they could do nothing, forcing refugees to stay in the mountains, or help 
them return to Iraq, and risk being killed.  
 
Within four days, 1,500 died from exposure, and the rest were uncertain 
what would happen if they stayed. Like in Israel, no NGOs claimed that the 
Turkish Government’s response was ethical. But helping with return 
seemed preferable, because the Turkish Government refused to change its 
policy regardless.29 
 
One might suppose that coercion dilemmas are not relevant when claims 
for asylum are heard in wealthier countries where, one might hope, genuine 
refugees would be given residency rights and freedoms. Yet even when 
claims are heard, strict evaluation criteria mean many refugees are denied 
refugee status.30 They are then detained and wish to repatriate. Some do, 
with the help of NGOs, and end up displaced again after their return.31 
Even if one believes that states have acted legally according to a strict 
definition of international law, it seems unlikely they are acting ethically, 
and so it remains unclear whether NGOs should assist with such returns.  
                                                 
28 Long 2013, 107. 
29 Long 2013, 107. 
30 Black and Gent 2006; Blitz, Sales, and Marzano 2005. 
31 Black and Gent 2006, 19. 
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This dilemma may be more pronounced when states lack the capacity to 
accept refugees. In such cases, states may deny refugees the right to work as 
well as lack the means to provide them aid to survive. This was the case 
between 1982 and 1984 when Djibouti both denied refugees work visas and 
reduced their rations, compelling many to return to Ethiopia. 32  More 
recently, Burundian refugees faced a choice between living in camps in 
Tanzania or returning to Burundi without access to basic necessities. 33 
Similarly, the Ugandan Government recently revoked land from South 
Sudanese refugees, and refugees in both Uganda and Kenya are often 
confined to camps, limiting their freedom.34 In such cases, we may blame 
wealthier states for failing to provide aid to poorer host states to increase 
their capacity to accept refugees, 35  but if refugees feel compelled to 
repatriate without this aid, it remains unclear whether NGOs and the UN 
should help with return.  
 
As noted, the current academic discussions focus almost entirely on state 
injustices,36  but the few scholars who do discuss the ethics of UNHCR 
repatriation tend to assume that a coerced return is, by definition, 
unprincipled.37 Their position is that UNHCR uses a distorted definition of 
‘voluntariness’, in which a refugee in detention is considered sufficiently 
free to consent to return,38 and that UNHCR has a ‘repatriation culture’.39 
                                                 
32 Crisp 1984. 
33 IRIN News Agency 2004; US Department of State 2014, iii.  
34 Hathaway 2005, 380.  
35 Koser and Black 1999, 2–17; Chimni 2004, 65. 
36 Bradley 2008, 2013; Long 2013. 
37 Barnett 2001; Long 2013. 
38 Barnett and Finnemore 2004, 100. 
39 Barnett and Finnemore 2004, 75; Harold-Bond 1989. 
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This critique is incomplete. Though the definition of voluntariness is 
skewed and the culture of repatriation problematic, UNHCR may be 
helping with involuntary returns because doing nothing is far worse.  
 
When OBI began its repatriation programme in 2010, it too was facing a 
coercion dilemma. Though South Sudanese were not prevented from 
working,40 they were denied legal residency, and some were detained. They 
could not apply for refugee status41 and, even if they could, their claims 
would likely be denied, as Israel provides refugee status to only 0.25 per 
cent of applicants.42  
 
Though conditions were difficult in Israel, returning to South Sudan 
entailed significant risks. South Sudan had only recently emerged from 
decades of war, mainly fought between southern Sudanese opposition 
forces and the ruling northern Sudanese forces.43 From 1991, the Southern 
Sudanese forces split into two opposing groups, one mainly from the Dinka 
ethnic group, and the other mainly of the Nuer ethnic group.44 When South 
Sudan eventually achieved independence from northern Sudan in 2011, a 
coalition government was formed in Juba, comprised of both Nuer and 
Dinka ethnic groups, but the president stifled dissenting voices,45 and inter-
ethnic violence continued into 2012, with thousands of civilians killed that 
                                                 
40 Mommers 2015.  
41 Mommers 2015. 
42 Ziegler 2015, 181. 
43 The Second Sudanese Civil war lasted from 1983 until 2005, leaving approximately two million 
dead from both the war itself and the consequences of the war, including famine and disease. For a 
more complete background on the history of South Sudan, see Breidlid, Androga, and Breidlid 
(2014). 
44 International Crisis Group 2014. 
45 Johnson 2014. 
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year alone.46 As a result of the instability, the country lacked basic services, 
including food security and healthcare.47  
 
Given that Israel let South Sudanese work in 2011, and given the conditions 
in South Sudan at the time, many refugees stayed in Israel. Consider, for 
example, Alek, who explains why she had initially left South Sudan, and 
why she did not return in 2011:  
 
I am from Unity State, and we fled the war to […] Khartoum 
when I was a young girl. Later, I married there, and had four 
kids, and crossed into Israel, via Egypt, in 2007. I was in prison 
for half a year, but then released, so decided to stay. It was good. 
I worked, at first, in the Renaissance hotel in Tel Aviv. The kids 
went to school.48 
 
But others wished to return, such as Joseph: 
 
My state is Lega State […] I was born in Khartoum in 1982, but 
came back to South Sudan from 1995 until 2000, so I was familiar 
with Juba. I went to Egypt in 2000, and in 8 August 2005 I went 
to Israel […] I went to prison for one year, and after one year 
they released us. I worked in a hotel, but could not get an ID, or 
legally start a business. So I saved $20,000. I was in touch with 
my family in Juba, and so asked for help returning.49 
 
 
Joseph was one of the first refugees to return. At the time, many human 
rights organizations opposed OBI’s assistance, claiming Joseph and others 
                                                 
46 McCallum and Okech 2013. 
47 Médecins Sans Frontières 2014.  
48 Interview with Alek, Juba, 25 December 2013. 
49 Interview with Joseph, Juba, 10 April 2012. 
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had few rights, and so their return was involuntary.50 In response, OBI 
hired the Hebrew Immigrant Aid Society (HIAS) to interview each refugee, 
asking them ‘Why do you want to return?’. If an individual said they were 
only returning to avoid detention, their return was viewed as involuntary 
and not supported.  
 
In total, OBI and HIAS helped roughly 900 individuals return between 2009 
and 2012. Once an asylum seeker left Israel they could not re-enter Israeli 
territory. 51  But OBI and HIAS were convinced that this choice, though 
irreversible, was entirely voluntary.  
 
OBI’s intentions seemed genuinely humanitarian. It was a Christian 
humanitarian organization with a strong history of providing food, shelter 
and medical assistance to all denominations in developing countries.52 It 
had never, until 2010, been involved in repatriation. Nor had HIAS, a 
humanitarian organization founded in 1881 to assist Jews fleeing pogroms 
in Russia and Eastern Europe, but which later focused on helping non-
Jewish refugees, resettling 3,600 refugees from Vietnam, Cambodia and 
Laos in the United States.53  HIAS said it opposed repatriation in other 
contexts, refusing to assist with repatriation from Kenya due to the risks 
                                                 
50 Interview with HIAS Israel director, Jerusalem, 12 December 2012; Mommers 2015. 
51 Interview with HIAS Israel director, Jerusalem, 12 December 2012. 
52 See http://www.ob.org/frequently-asked/. Some subjects believed that OBI was a Christian Zionist 
organization, and was motivated to help the Israeli Government decrease the number of refugees in 
Israel. I found no evidence, however, of these motivations. Nonetheless, further research on this 
topic is warranted, to help clarify OBI’s possibly hidden motivations. As one reviewer helpfully 
pointed out, understanding whether facilitators are humanitarian or religious can provide a fuller 
picture of repatriation. Indeed, if OBI had ulterior religious or political motives, then it was perhaps 
exploiting refugees, encouraging return to promote its own values, rather than refugees’ wellbeing 
and rights. I put this aside for now. For even if OBI was completely humanitarian, and only 
intending to help refugees, there is still a major ethical dilemma as to whether they should have 
provided such return.  
53 http://www.hias.org/history 
 16 
involved.54 In Israel it made an exception, as it could conduct individual 
interviews to ensure there was no coercion. 
 
In total, of the 126 subjects I interviewed, sixty-seven returned because they 
thought life was better in South Sudan and not only to avoid difficult 
conditions in Israel. However, there was a marked distinction between 
those who returned prior to and after 2012.  
 
That year, thousands of Israeli citizens marched through the streets of Tel 
Aviv, calling for the expulsion of African asylum seekers, described by the 
prime minister as ‘flooding the country’55 and by one politician as a ‘cancer 
to the body’.56 Legislation was passed to detain asylum seekers,57 and all 
South Sudanese were told they must return58 or face imprisonment,59 with 
the exception of those who had medical problems. Alek describes life 
during this period, and why she changed her mind about staying in Israel: 
 
Every day started with a mess. You go outside and they tell you, 
‘Go back to your country! Why are you here? Your country has 
money! Go home!’  
 
In June they took my husband’s visa and said, ‘We will not give 
you a new visa’. We were left without work for two months. I 
said ‘What? What will I do […]?’ So I thought, ‘I will say thank 
you to God that we are healthy and go back’.60 
 
                                                 
54 HIAS Kenya 2015. 
55 Harriett Sherwood 2012.  
56 Yaar and Hermann 2012. 
57 Law for the Prevention of Infiltration (Crimes and Jurisdiction (Amendment No. 3 and Temporary 
Order) 5772-2012 (Amendment 3). 
58 PIBA 2011. 
59 Gerver 2014b. 
60 Interview with Alek, Juba, 25 December 2013. 
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Alek called OBI, which eventually agreed to help her return.61 Hundreds of 
others soon followed. Of the 126 subjects I interviewed in East Africa, 
thirty-seven had returned to avoid detention, and thirty-six returned 
partially or wholly because they could no longer work, fearing they would 
lack access to basic necessities if they stayed. Fourteen left because they 
feared deportation.  
 
It is not immediately clear whether OBI’s first policy of refusing coerced 
returns was better than its second policy of supporting such returns. 
Neither was more principled than the other. It may seem ethical to only 
help with voluntary returns, but this would force refugees to stay in 
detention. The case demonstrates that the dilemmas of repatriation cannot 
be avoided even when working independently from the government, and 
even with the best of intentions and resources.  
 
2.2 Resolving the Dilemma  
To resolve this dilemma relating to coercion, we must address a pressing 
question: whether refugees can truly give their consent when faced with 
coercion. In many cases outside the sphere of repatriation, consent may 
very well be valid even if there are only injurious alternatives. A patient is 
perfectly capable of giving consent to life-saving surgery, even though the 
alternative to surgery is death. As such, some philosophers argue that cases 
of ‘third-party coercion’ are also cases of valid consent. 62  For example, 
imagine that Abbey threatens to shoot Babu if he does not buy Cathy’s 
watch. Cathy sells Babu her watch because she does not want him shot by 
                                                 
61 Interview with Gat Bɛɛl, Juba, 21 December, 2013; Interview with Niko, Juba, 14 December 
2013; Interview with Alek, Juba, 25 December 2013. 
62 Miller and Wertheimer 2009, 94. 
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Abbey. Babu’s consent seems valid for Cathy, even if not for Abbey. One 
could similarly argue that refugees’ consent is valid for repatriation 
facilitators, even if it is not valid consent for the government. 
 
However, according to a number of ethicists, consent would be invalid for 
Cathy if she could easily persuade Abbey to put her gun down.63 Cathy 
should do this, instead of selling her watch. In other words, Cathy’s duty is 
to get Abbey to stop threatening Babu, and therefore Babu’s consent is not 
valid for Cathy. This approach is consistent with the Good Samaritan 
principle, which holds that agents should help those in great need if they 
easily can.64 If there is nothing that Cathy can do, then Babu’s consent is 
perfectly valid for her, but not if she can easily help stop Abbey’s violent 
threat.  
 
With repatriation to dangerous countries, we may ask if a facilitator can 
easily raise money for basic necessities and legal aid to avoid detention. If 
instead it raises money for repatriation, then it fails to honour the Good 
Samaritan principle. Of course, basic necessities may be an ongoing cost, 
while repatriation is a one-off cost. But if a refugee lacks necessities after 
they have returned, it is unclear if the repatriation facilitator can simply 
ignore their needs. If they owed them this aid before return, an action 
absolving them of this duty without alleviating the need seems unethical.65  
 
                                                 
63 Millum 2014. 
64 Gibney 2004. 
65 Some may argue that, if a refugee has returned, there is a weaker duty to aid them because NGOs 
owe less to those who are far away.  Nonetheless, there may remain a duty to aid this refugee if she 
continues to lack basic needs, and is not a stranger to the NGO. For a broader discussion on whether 
distance matters in duties to aid, see Kamm 2000. 
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In addition to Good Samaritan duties, organizations may have costlier 
duties. Humanitarian organizations in particular, which were created 
precisely to protect vulnerable populations, should be held to a higher 
standard in protecting these populations. This may translate to special 
duties, such as lobbying for policy changes, providing legal aid and raising 
money for necessities. Demanding costly duties from Cathy, by contrast, 
could infringe upon her right to a personal life. While organizational staff 
also have a private life, they have voluntarily agreed to allocate an insulated 
portion of their lives to the goals of the organization, so their personal lives 
are not infringed upon.  
 
Some organizations may also have costly duties because they have 
significant power.66 When an agent has power, they have a greater ability to 
help others, and so may have a greater duty to help.67 For example, a doctor 
on a flight may have a duty to save a life because she can more easily do so, 
even if this is difficult for her. Similarly, Medicins Sans Frontiers may have 
a duty to widely publicize a famine68 because they are more able to do so. If 
repatriation facilitators have a greater ability to publicize the plight of 
refugees and lobby for the end of coercive conditions,69 they should take 
these actions, even if they are more difficult than only helping with 
repatriation.  
 
There are situations in which repatriation facilitators do work hard to end 
coercive conditions, but fail to create any change. In such cases, assisting 
                                                 
66 Rubenstein, 2014, 218. 
67 Jeske 2014; Orsi 2008. 
68 Barnett 2011. 
69 Barnett 2011. 
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with return may be legitimate. For example, when Kurdish refugees were 
trapped between Iraq and Turkey, NGOs tried and failed to persuade the 
Turkish Government to provide them asylum. More refugees were likely to 
die from exposure, and so NGOs acted ethically when helping with their 
return. Similarly, had OBI and HIAS worked hard to end detention, but 
failed, perhaps helping with return would have been legitimate, so long as 
South Sudanese nationals were aware of the risks. 
 
This conclusion is predicated on the assumption that repatriation does not 
itself causally contribute to coercion. If there is such a causative link, then 
further considerations become relevant, which I will now address. 
 
3. CAUSATION 
Causation dilemmas encompass three categories of causal scenario. In all 
three, helping refugees to repatriate causally contributes to coercive 
government policies. As such, return should generally not be facilitated, 
with some exceptions.  
 
3.1 Simple Counterfactual Causation 
In cases of simple counterfactual causation, an agent causes an event if, had 
the agent not acted as she had, the event would not have occurred.70  
 
If the government is detaining refugees to encourage return, and an 
organization makes return possible, this can motivate the government to 
detain more refugees than it otherwise would. The IOM is an example of an 
                                                 
70 I also assume that, for an agent to cause an outcome, it must be the case that, in acting as she did, 
the outcome did occur. See Lewis 1973. 
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organization that may have such an impact. It visits survival migrants in 
detention around the world, taking down their details and trying to secure 
their passports so they can repatriate, when they otherwise would not be 
able to.71 If governments are only detaining refugees so that they repatriate, 
and refugees are only repatriating because of the IOM, then the IOM may 
be causally contributing to detention.  
 
UNHCR may contribute to coercive policies in a similar manner. In 1994 
and 1995 it began facilitating the repatriation of the Rohingyan refugees 
from Bangladesh to Burma. Soon after, the Bangladeshi Government 
significantly increased its pressure on refugees to return, seeing that their 
return was now possible, as it was funded by UNHCR.72 Similarly, in 2012, 
one Israeli Knesset report states that an NGO had established that 
repatriation for South Sudanese was possible, and so the government could 
endorse a more aggressive return policy for those who had not yet 
returned.73  
 
Facilitating return may also increase a government’s capacity to use 
coercive measures. When OBI helped a refugee return from detention, the 
government quickly filled his cell with a new refugee, who had previously 
not been detained, maintaining the government’s policy of filling the 
detention centre to its maximum capacity. 74  Thus in this scenario, 
repatriation efforts directly determine the rate of detention at a given time.  
 
                                                 
71 Ashutosha and Mountz 2011. 
72 Barnett and Finnemore 2004, 106. 
73 Knesset Protocol 84 (Hebrew) 2012. 
74 Lior 2014; The Migrant 2015.  
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The case of Israel raises an additional complication, overlooked in the 
examples above. OBI and HIAS were not the only agents facilitating return. 
The government also began its own repatriation programme in 2012, 75 
eventually returning thousands of asylum seekers.76 In other countries, UN 
agencies, multiple private charities and refugees themselves pay for 
transport home. 
 
In such a scenario, any single NGO helping with return may seem to have 
no impact on the level of coercion, nor may it have any impact if any single 
means of repatriation fails. If existing bodies have the capacity to repatriate 
all refugees, a single NGO may well not causally contribute to coercion. For, 
were it to discontinue its repatriation services, refugees would still be able 
to repatriate at the same rate, via a different facilitator. However, if the 
other facilitators are incapable of facilitating all refugees, then each 
facilitator directly contributes to the rate of detention. The more agencies 
that are available for repatriation, the more refugees can repatriate, freeing 
up cells for further detention. 
 
When NGOs’ actions are necessary for coercive policies, coercion is not a 
mere background condition, but is dependent on repatriation. This leads to 
a simple argument for NGOs discontinuing repatriation services, related to 
the Good Samaritan principle: refraining from helping with return is 
costless. If this costless act of omission helps refugees avoid detention and 
coercive conditions, then, as organizations created to help others, they 
should exploit this omission to efficiently achieve their goals. 
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We might argue that, in some cases, causally contributing to coercion does 
not harm refugees. In my sample, some refugees did not particularly mind 
that the government threatened to detain them or revoke their visas, 
because they would have returned regardless, for reasons unrelated to 
coercion. Some missed their families, or wished to contribute to the 
development of their country.  
 
Even for these cases, it may be wrong for NGOs and the UN to help with 
return, because it is wrong to causally contribute to coercive policies, even if 
those subject to coercion do not feel subjectively worse off. For example, 
imagine again that Abbey puts a gun to Babu’s head, telling him to buy 
Cathy’s watch, but Babu secretly wanted to buy the watch regardless. When 
Cathy sells her watch, she may be making Babu’s life better in some ways, 
but she is also causally contributing to Abbey’s act of raising a gun to 
another person’s head. In such cases, Cathy should refuse to sell Babu her 
watch if she knows that this refusal will make Abbey put down her gun. 
She should wait until Abbey does this, and only then sell Babu her watch.  
 
In a similar way, NGOs and the UN should avoid encouraging 
governments to detain refugees, as the act of detention is especially unjust, 
even if many refugees would have returned regardless. Repatriation 
facilitators should wait until the government ends detention, and only then 
agree to help with return. 
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3.2 Causation as Influence 
There are instances in which repatriation is not necessary for coercion, and 
so does not cause coercion in the counterfactual sense. Facilitating 
repatriation may still be wrong according to other ethical criteria. 
Sometimes a person wrongly causes an event by influencing it, even if their 
actions were not necessary for the general event to occur.77  
 
For an example of such causation, imagine there is an assassin, and she 
pulls her trigger, leading the bullet to shoot out of her barrel into the heart 
of a victim, unjustly killing him on the spot. She also has a hundred backup 
assassins, who would have killed the victim had she not killed him first.78 
As such, she was not necessary for his death, or even almost necessary for 
it.79 She still causally contributed to his death if she influenced the particular 
way the death transpired. This would be the case if, in a world without her, 
the bullet would have flown in a slightly different direction, piercing the 
victim’s heart in a different place, while in a world without other assassins, 
her bullet would have still flown in the same direction, piercing the victim’s 
heart in the same way. 
 
In such cases, even if the assassin influences the event, and so causally 
contributed to it, we might still claim that she did not influence it in a way 
that harmed the victim; he would have been killed regardless. Nonetheless, 
as noted above, we have duties to avoid causally contributing to injustices, 
even if the victims are made no worse off from the injustice. The assassin 
may be acting wrongly by causally contributing to the injustice that 
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occurred, regardless of whether the victim is worse off compared to a world 
in which the assassin does not pull her trigger. In a similar sense, a single 
NGO may be wrongly causally contributing to an injustice even if, had they 
not provided return, the general injustice would still have occurred.  
 
In cases where we causally contribute to injustice by influencing the event, 
such causal influence may still be justified if the influence is significantly 
helpful for the victim. The assassin, for example, may know she can more 
accurately shoot the victim directly at the centre mass of his body, leading 
to a quicker death, compared to the backup assassins. If the assassin is in no 
way responsible for the presence of other assassins, and is shooting the 
victim only to reduce suffering, pulling the trigger may be morally justified. 
In a similar manner, an NGO can justifiably help with repatriation in cases 
where, though the help causally contributes to unjust coercion, it can also 
ensure a much safer return than would otherwise take place. However, 
unless the NGO is quite certain that its actions significantly help with 
return, it should avoid helping with repatriation, to avoid causally 
contributing to injustice. 
 
3.3 Uncertainty 
In some cases, a given NGO has essentially no influence. Its actions are not 
necessary for coercion, and it does not influence coercion or the safety of 
return. This may be the case if there are multiple NGOs, each one providing 
equally safe repatriation, such that if one pulled out, the level of coercion 
and safety of return would be the same. Similarly, there may be only one 
NGO, but the government is detaining refugees both to encourage return 
and to placate protesters, or to deter new refugees from arriving in the 
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country. We might suppose that an NGO assisting with return here in no 
way causally contributes to coercive policies. For, had it not been for 
repatriation, there would still be other decisive reasons for the government 
to detain refugees. In such cases, an NGO may still have a strong reason to 
avoid helping with return.  
 
An agent has a reason to avoid an act if she subjectively suspects that it may 
increase the probability of a harmful event occurring,80 even if she is not 
ultimately necessary for the outcome and does not influence it. Imagine two 
assassins pull their triggers at the same time, both bullets flying out of their 
barrels simultaneously, piercing the victim’s heart in the same location at 
the same moment, such that neither assassin influenced his death.81 One 
reason that each assassin acted wrongly is that, at the time she pulled her 
trigger, she could never be 100 per cent certain the other would pull her 
trigger. In choosing to pull her own trigger, she increased the probability, in 
her mind, of the death occurring.  
 
When there are multiple facilitators helping with return, then neither can 
ever be 100 per cent certain that the others will make return possible. In 
choosing to help with repatriation, they risk possibly increasing the chances 
of repatriation occurring, and thus the chances of coercion occurring. 
Similarly, when the government has multiple reasons for using coercive 
policies, the NGO can never know for certain that the government will still 
detain refugees in the event that repatriation is no longer a possibility. As 
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such, repatriation should be discontinued, so that NGOs are certain that 
they are not causally contributing to injustice. 
 
Nonetheless, an exception may be made if the government has a large 
number of reasons for detaining refugees, such that detention would almost 
certainly continue even if repatriation ceased. Helping with such coerced 
returns is not ideal, but may be ethical, as the causal impact on coercion is 
unlikely, and the benefits significant if refugees truly wish to return.  
 
We have, as such, reached a general conclusion: coerced repatriation should 
only be facilitated if it does not significantly contribute to the coercive 
policies, and if all efforts have been made to first stop the coercive policies. 
Such repatriation is ethical on balance, assuming refugees are aware of the 
risks.  
 
4. RISKS 
Refugees cannot always be aware of the risks of returning, as there is often 
insufficient data on the country they are returning to. Current discussions 
of repatriation tend to overlook this point, focusing on the importance of a 
safe return.82 But the most unsafe areas in the world are the most difficult 
places to conduct research in, and so the risks are most difficult to calculate. 
When the safety of return is impossible to establish, there is a risk dilemma. 
 
                                                 
82 Bradley 2013; Long 2013. 
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Such was the case for Ugandan refugees living in Zaire and Southern Sudan 
in the 1980s,83 Rohingya refugees living in Bangladesh in the 1990s84 and 
South Sudanese refugees living in Israel in the 2000s. Some had last lived in 
their countries as young children, or not at all, their parents having fled 
before they were born.85 The problem is not only that refugees often do not 
know what will happen if they go back; there is often insufficient data to 
even predict the likelihood that they will be harmed.86  
 
Consider how this impacted South Sudanese refugees in Israel. Seven 
subjects, including Alek and George, returned to Unity State, where 140,000 
had been displaced in 2012,87 but where even an estimated death toll has 
never been publicized. 88  Twenty-three subjects returned to Upper Nile, 
three returned to Abyei and one returned to Warap State, where tens of 
thousands were displaced in all three areas, at least hundreds killed, but the 
precise number of displaced and killed is unknown.89 Ten returning were 
from Jonglei. Here, data are slightly more complete, but still sparse. One 
estimate states that 200,000 were displaced90 and at least 2,700 civilians 
killed in 2011–12,91 but the precise number of deaths was never confirmed, 
and the total population of Jonglei had never been accurately counted in a 
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reliable census.92 Seven returnees were from the town of Akobo in Jonglei, 
where between 250 and 1,000 civilians were killed between 2011 and 2012, 
but the precise number was never confirmed, and the total population of 
the town never counted.  
 
In discussions of informed consent, scholars emphasize that individuals 
should be told about possible side effects and the chances of improvement 
from an intervention. 93  Such informed consent is rarely possible for 
refugees. This is because there is rarely detailed data available on atrocities 
as they are occurring. Indeed, even after an atrocity, data are rarely 
available, except in rare cases, such as the Holocaust and the Rwandan 
genocide.94 In most cases, no organized logs are available for refugees to 
know the risks of returning.  
 
I asked subjects why they returned, given the unknown risks. Most 
responded that it was precisely because they did not know the risks that 
they returned. Alek used a comparative judgement: 
 
I was in prison for six months in Israel. I didn’t like it. If I don’t 
know what it’s like in South Sudan, but I know I hated prison in 
Israel, I would prefer to go to South Sudan […] it might have 
been worse, but it might have been better.95  
 
 
                                                 
92 South Sudanese National Disarmament, Demobilization, and Reintegration Commission.  
93 Allen and Wertheimer 2009; Manson and O’Neill 2007. 
94 Kellow and Steeves 1998; Seltzer 1998; Verwimp 2006. 
95 Interview with Alek, Juba, 25 December 2013. 
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Alek is from the Dinka tribe, but grew up among the Nuer, and speaks the 
languages of both tribes fluently. Two years after her return, Dinka militias 
came to her home, believing she was Nuer. She fled, returning two days 
later to find her furniture and clothes stolen. ‘When we come home’, she 
explains, ‘people on the street look at us. They don’t ask questions. They 
don’t know what tribe I’m from’.  
 
She does not regret her choice to repatriate from Israel,96 but others did. Of 
the fifty-eight adults I interviewed at the end of 2012–2014, thirty-two 
wished they had never returned at all. Samuel, who returned from Israel to 
avoid detention, felt this way: 
 
I was at home in Juba when soldiers started shooting at 10:00pm. 
We thought we were not included in the problem. But soldiers 
shot at my friends who stayed with me. Two were killed. I put 
on a pair of shoes – they weren’t mine – and ran. I left all my 
things. I arrived in the UN IDP camp on the December 17th. I 
cannot leave. So I am in a prison. I think, ‘In Israel prison would 
have been better because my enemy is not outside of the prison 
doors’.97 
 
 
OBI did not ignore the possibility that many would regret returning 
because of the lack of information on the conditions in South Sudan. To 
address this problem, the NGO called returnees and visited them after 
repatriation, to find out if each individual was safe. If they were, OBI took 
this as evidence that other refugees could safely return to these areas. 
However, when I visited families in secondary towns and rural villages, 
                                                 
96 Interview with Alek, Juba, 25 December 2013. 
97 Interview with Samuel, Juba, 21 December 2013. 
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and those in IDP camps, they explained that they never received a call or 
visit from OBI. This was partly because they had no electricity, and so their 
cell phones rarely worked. As such, it appears OBI’s attempts to visit 
returnees suffered from a type of survivor bias. Those most difficult to 
contact were the least able to access regular food, medicine or housing. 
Once an individual fled South Sudan, they no longer held the same cell 
phone numbers, and so those I interviewed in Ethiopia or Uganda were 
never in touch with OBI.  
 
As such, despite pouring significant resources into flying regularly to South 
Sudan, the organization largely failed to learn about individuals after 
return. In 2012, towards the end of OBI’s project, aid organizations that had 
assisted families while they were in Israel made efforts to contact them after 
their return. They found that at least twenty-five of 500 returning children 
died within their first year post-repatriation.98 More children likely died 
during this period, as most were never contacted by any aid organization. 
Out of the twenty-seven adults and children I interviewed in South Sudan 
in 2012, only five had access to any income or food security. All twenty-nine 
I interviewed in Uganda in 2013 lacked a basic income after return.  
 
During the war, I learned about the conditions of an additional 110 
returnees, based on the sixty-one interviews I conducted in 2013 and 2014. 
Of the thirty-two returnees who were of the Nuer ethnic group, all had fled 
Dinka militias. Twenty-four of these individuals had no income or family 
support before fleeing to IDP camps. They lived off less than one meal per 
day, mostly consisting of corn flour, and so failed to obtain the basic 
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nutrients necessary for survival according to World Health Organization 
standards.99 Thirty-seven of the 110 returnees were living outside of the IDP 
camp but inside South Sudan, nineteen of whom had no income and also 
lacked food security. Twenty-five had left South Sudan, and only two of 
these individuals had an income. The remaining returnees were without 
basic medical care or food security. In total, I learned of one subject killed in 
crossfire during the war, and four killed because of their ethnicity, 
including two children shot at gunpoint, aged three and five. There were 
most likely more I never heard about, due to survivor bias in my sample.  
Given the uncertain risks, should NGOs and the UN assist with return?  
 
When risks are certain, then refugees should perhaps be able to decide for 
themselves whether they would prefer to stay in detention or return. This is 
because the trade-off between freedom and security is highly subjective. 
People have very different answers to the question, ‘would you rather stay 
indefinitely in a cell, or have a one in ten chance of being killed over the 
next twenty years?’. When risks are unknown, we cannot ask a refugee this 
question. As such, when facilitating return, NGOs cannot be certain they 
are providing a service that is consistent with refugees’ preferences. Yet one 
may also feel that refugees have the right to consent to a future with 
unknown risks, rather than stay in detention.  
 
To address this dilemma, repatriation facilitators should gather more 
information on past returnees, act to counter the effects of survivor bias, 
and establish a more complete picture of the environment refugees will be 
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returning to. When possible, the facilitators should venture into rural areas, 
rather than relying on cell phones alone.  
 
Often, even when information can be gathered, it soon becomes irrelevant 
as political conditions change in a country of origin. For example, Juba was 
relatively safe in 2012, but unsafe for Nuer citizens in 2013. Because 
conditions can change, NGOs and the UN should lobby for re-admittance 
agreements, allowing refugees who returned to re-enter the host country. In 
the 1990s, the governments of Sweden, France and the United Kingdom 
allowed Bosnian refugees to either briefly travel to Bosnia before making a 
final decision or to re-enter after returning.100  On a more limited scale, 
UNHCR organized ‘go-and-see’ visits for Burundian refugees in 
Tanzania.101 More generally, refugees may have a ‘right to regret’102 their 
decision, and return to the host country, given the risks involved in 
returning. Importantly, if a given NGO is the only body making return 
possible, they might refuse to help with return until the government agrees 
to allow such readmission to refugees. 
 
Ultimately, repatriation facilitators may fail to persuade the government to 
institute such a policy, and research may still be impossible to conduct. In 
such cases, facilitators should at least be explicit to refugees about their 
inability to disclose the risks, and recognize they may not be providing a 
safe return, but merely a flight home to an unknown future.  
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5. CONCLUSION 
When a refugee is detained, her choices are far from voluntary. Given that 
this is the case, humanitarian agents have two options, neither ideal. They 
can help with an unsafe return, and free refugees from detention, or refuse 
to help, forcing them to stay. In reality, this dilemma comes in three forms, 
requiring three distinct policies.  
 
In the first form, the government will arrest refugees, force them into 
detention or deny them visas regardless of whether they return. NGOs and 
the UN should lobby for an end to such policies, and appeal to donors to 
provide food security and shelter. If they fail, it may be ethical to facilitate 
return, so long as refugees are aware of the risks. 
 
In the second form of the dilemma, repatriation causes coercion. Facilitators 
are not mere third parties, as their actions impact government policies, 
whether intentionally or not. The more refugees are able to repatriate from 
detention, the more spaces become available in detention centres. This not 
only allows the government to detain more refugees, it gives them a reason 
to, seeing that past detainees were persuaded to return. In such cases, 
NGOs and the UN should not help with return unless their assistance has 
only a small impact on coercion, and ensures a much safer return than 
would otherwise take place.  
 
In all cases where assistance is ethical, the risks of return should still be 
clearly communicated to refugees. When risks are not known to facilitators, 
and refugees know little about the country they are returning to, it remains 
unclear if return should be provided. If facilitators clearly communicate to 
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refugees that the risks are unknown, perhaps refugees should still have the 
choice to repatriate. But in helping with such return, refugees may be 
returning to a country where, had they known the risks, they would not 
have returned. As such, repatriation does not truly assist refugees, and may 
be contrary to the very goals of the NGO.  
 
The general lessons I raise may be applicable to areas outside of refugee 
repatriation. NGOs often provide assistance to vulnerable populations who 
may feel forced to accept the assistance because their options are 
constrained by coercive government policies. For example, NGOs may 
provide housing to those who have been displaced, food to those whose 
land has been illegally revoked103 or medical assistance to those who have 
been tortured.104 Though these cases may be different from repatriation, it 
might still be useful to consider if NGOs have the ability to end coercive 
policies, if their assistance causally contributes to further coercive policies, 
and if recipients are aware of the risks of accepting various forms of aid.  
 
Further research is necessary to determine how generalizable my 
conclusions are. For now, we can at least consider how NGOs and the UN, 
when helping with repatriation, might change their policies and practice. 
 
Today, repatriation facilitators spend little of their budget on lobbying for 
the end of coercive conditions, and more on flights, stipends and 
coordinating return. This is partly because NGOs and the UN often rely on 
government grants, at times competing with other NGOs to repatriate 
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refugees at the lowest possible cost, at the fastest possible rate.105 But even 
NGOs that raise their own funds, such as OBI, continue allocating their 
entire budget to repatriation, feeling pressure from refugees who want to 
return as quickly as possible, to avoid detention. Though refugees have 
good reasons to return quickly, NGOs have good reasons to slow down 
return, freeing up resources for lobbying, and possibly dissuading 
governments from detaining quite so many refugees. Such a policy shift for 
NGOs may mean fewer refugees can return, but fewer may want to if 
conditions improve in the host country. 
 
Even when conditions will not improve, because governments refuse to 
change their policies, NGOs and the UN can still ensure a more informed 
return. They can conduct more rigorous post-return evaluations, 
interviewing former refugees in rural and insecure areas, to determine 
displacement and mortality after return. If researchers cannot access unsafe 
areas, they may still be able to call relatives of those who returned, to find 
out their conditions. More importantly, they can still travel to safer 
surrounding countries and interview those who have fled after repatriating.  
 
Today, the UN explicitly states that it lacks the capacity to conduct such 
research. 106  This may be because the current budget is earmarked for 
repatriation itself, paying for the transport of hundreds of thousands of 
refugees annually.107 Funds should be shifted from maximizing the number 
who return towards establishing a minimum quality of information to 
provide refugees before return.  
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When George called OBI in 2012, it might have implemented a different 
policy, in light of these conclusions. It is unclear that George’s detention 
was inevitable. The NGO might have done more to persuade the 
government to provide George residency, or to provide greater residency 
rights for South Sudanese nationals in general. OBI should also have waited 
to facilitate this return, to see whether the government would eventually 
free him, seeing that he had no way of going back. Even if continued 
detention was likely, George was not making an informed choice. He was 
forced to fly to a country he knew little about. When he landed, he failed to 
find permanent shelter, employment or security.108 In some ways, this was 
not OBI’s fault. The NGO lacked access to information on the risks, and 
there was a limit to how much information they could find. But if 
information is not available, perhaps a ticket should not be available either.  
 
For George, and millions of others, immigration control involves not just 
force, but assistance. How organizations provide assistance can impact how 
governments respond, and how refugees react. If we are to have a fuller 
picture of what an ethical refugee policy would entail, we must shift our 
focus away from the policeman who followed George home, and onto 
NGOs who sit in small offices, answering calls from refugees who feel they 
need help returning, and quickly. While the urgency is clear, the best policy 
is not.  
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